

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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RUTH CALDERÓN-CARDONA, et al.,

Civil Action No.: 3:08cv01367

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
a.k.a. NORTH KOREA, et al.,

Defendants.

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REPORT OF PROFESSOR BRUCE BECHTOL

I, Bruce Bechtol, of Quantico, VA, declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, as follows:

A. Professional Background

1. I am a Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, a post that I have held since 2005. From 2003-2005, I was an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College. I was an adjunct Visiting Professor at the Korea University Graduate School of International Studies (2006-2007) and was also an adjunct Professor of Diplomacy at Norwich University (2005-2009). I received my Ph.D. in National Security Studies from the Union Institute, my master's degree in international affairs from the Catholic University and my bachelor's degree from Excelsior College.

2. I have had extensive experience in the military, having served on active duty for 20 years in the U.S. Marine Corps at various locations in the western Pacific and East Asia. From 1997 until 2003, I was an Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. I served as the Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate (J2) on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

3. I have written widely on Korean security issues, contributing articles to such journals as *Comparative Strategy*, *The International Journal of Korean Studies*, *Pacific Focus*, *The Korea Observer*, *East Asian Review*, *The Air and Space Power Journal*, *The International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, *Korean Quarterly*, and *Occasional Papers: The Journal of the Korea American Historical Society*.

4. I authored a comprehensive study of North Korea, *Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea*, (Potomac Books 2007). I edited *The Quest for a Unified Korea: Strategies for the Cultural and Interagency Process*, (Marine Corps University Foundation 2007). In addition, I was a contributing author to several books on North Korea, including: *The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century*, (Ashgate 2006); *Between Total Wars and Small Wars: Studies in the Societal History of the Cold War* (in German), (Hamburg Institute for Social Research 2006); and *Divided Korea: Longing for Reunification*, (North Park University Press 2004).

5. From 2004-2005, I was the editor of the *Defense Intelligence Journal*. From 2004-2009 I sat on the editorial review board of the *East Asian Review*.

6. In addition, I serve on the Boards of Directors of both the International Council on Korean Studies and the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies.

A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Appendix "A".

B. Nature of This Expert Witness Report

7. I have been asked by counsel for the plaintiffs in the case of Calderon et al. v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea et al., to provide my professional opinion as to whether the defendants in this action provided material support, resources, training, weapons and refuge to the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which jointly perpetrated the Lod Airport massacre of 1972, during the period relevant to that terrorist attack.

8. My opinion as set forth below is based upon my academic studies, research, teaching positions and publishing over the course of many years as an intelligence officer and expert on Korean affairs. I have obtained information from interviews with political leaders, reviews of documents, periodicals, credible news reports, discussions with reliable journalists, government publications, and scholarly works, as well as from my own experience, working, living and traveling in the Far East, particularly in South Korea. In preparing this opinion, I have examined the complaint filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants.

C. North Korea and Support to Terrorism¹

9. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (hereinafter "North Korea" or "DPRK") as a regime that supports terrorism begins as a story about an ideologically based policy (largely financed by the Soviet Union) and ends with a policy that in essence is designed purely to put money into the coffers of the elite in Pyongyang - in short, a "proliferation for hire"

¹ There are some excerpts in this paper from Dr. Bechtol's upcoming book, *Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security* (Dulles: VA, Potomac Books, 2010).

policy.² In this short paper, I will articulate a short commentary on the history of the North Korean regime, Kim Il-sung and his rise to power, the evolving North Korean foreign policy goals, a history of support to terrorist groups, and current issues dealing with proliferation and support to state and non-state actors, primarily terrorist organizations.

D. North Korea's Beginnings and Kim Il-sung's Rise to Power

10. The history of the North Korean regime truly begins during WWII. During that war, there were several partisan groups that fought with (and under the command of) both Soviet and Chinese military forces. One of these groups was led by a young commander named Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung was actually picked by the Soviets to help lead his new nation (North Korea) following the end of WWII. It is important to note that the beginnings of the DPRK were closely supervised by Soviet "advisers," the country was completely subsidized by the Soviet Union, and the military (and paramilitary) forces utilized Soviet doctrine in their operations and training.³ During the Korean War (initiated by North Korea based on a plan drawn up with the advice and supervision of Soviet advisors), Kim Il-sung also developed a relationship with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), which came to his aid following a near collapse of DPRK forces after the battle of Inchon and the ensuing push north of American-led UN forces. The Chinese essentially dedicated large numbers of military forces to the war (eventually, more than a million Chinese troops were fighting in the Korean theater of operations by war's end) at the request of

² For an example of historical cases of North Korean proliferation, see: James Cotton, "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Proliferation and Regional Security," *Current Issues Brief, 1, 1999-2000*, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, August 31, 1999, URL: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib01.htm>

³ For more background on the role Soviet advisors played in the early history of North Korea, see: Andrei Lankov, "Interpreting North Korean History," *Asia Times*, August 18, 2005, URL: <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GH18Dg02.html>

Stalin, who provided funding, logistics, and military equipment to both China and North Korea.⁴ This was the beginning of a relationship that Pyongyang would have with both the USSR and the PRC, a relationship that continued even after Beijing and Moscow came to a parting of the ways.

11. Kim Il-sung's rise to power is both interesting and a case study in the uniqueness of Korean culture and society. Kim was "appointed" the leader of North Korea - formally - by the Soviets in 1948 (although he was the de facto Soviet appointed leader from 1945 on), and "elected" as the "Premier of the Republic" during the same time frame.⁵ Despite Kim's rise to power (with the backing of his Soviet supporters), from 1945 until the late 1950s, he had anything but a complete consolidation of power. Of course, the Korean War (which he was at the forefront of initiating) put a delay in his complete control of the country, but perhaps equally as importantly, Kim was also faced with both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in his own Supreme People's Assembly and other key governmental institutions. Between 1955 and 1958, Kim Il-sung essentially purged all or most of those in both the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions within the Korea Workers Party (KWP) and all other aspects of government and society. By 1958 all Chinese troops had been withdrawn from North Korea, never to return.⁶ This left

⁴ For more analysis on the Soviet dealings with both China and North Korea, on military support provided to both, and on the planning they were involved in with the North Koreans for the invasion of South Korea, see: Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War: New Evidence from Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 8, November, 1993, URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Working_Paper_8.pdf
For an excellent analysis of the Chinese Involvement in the Korean War, see: Patrick A. Reiter, "Initial Communist Chinese Logistics in the Korean War," *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*, Autumn, 2004, URL:
http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/OQMG/professional_bulletin/2004/Autumn04/Initial_Communist_Chinese_Logistics_in_the_Korean_War.htm

⁵ "Soviets Groomed Kim Il-sung for Leadership," *Seoul Times*, November 12, 2009, URL: <http://theseoultimes.com/ST/?url=/ST/db/read.php?idx=1937>

⁶ For more analysis on the purges Kim Il-sung conducted in the late 1950s and the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from North Korea, see: Chen Jian, "Limits of the 'Lips and Teeth' Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese-North Korean Relations," *Asia Program*

Kim in complete control of the country, its economy, its government, its society, and its military forces. This complete control continues today and has been passed on to his son, Kim Chong-il (sometimes spelled Jong-il). A study of the elder Kim's rise to power reflects the traditional isolationism of Korean society for hundreds of years and the resistance to outside influence.⁷ It also reflects a Confucianist tradition of absolute loyalty to an individual leader, which was the end result by 1958. North Korea continued to take massive amounts of aid (it was completely subsidized by the Soviet Union until 1990) from both Moscow, and to a lesser extent, Beijing, but neither of these nations had an impact on how the country was (and is) run.⁸

E. North Korea's Foreign Policy Goals and Support for Terrorism: 1960-1988

12. As discussed earlier, North Korea from 1948 until the end of the Cold War could legitimately be described as a nation-state that fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. But it was also a nation that was far more isolated in every way than even other communist states - to include countries like China and Cuba. It was this isolationism that kept the Stalinist government of Kim Il-sung "pure," and allowed him to completely dominate all aspects of government and society in North Korea. This North Korean philosophy, formally defined by Pyongyang as

Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September, 2003, URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/asia_rpt115b.pdf

⁷ See: David Kendall and Ro Ji-woong, "Rebirth of a Nation: From Hermit Kingdom to Global Player," *Korea-Net*, July 8, 2007, URL: http://www.korea.net/news/News/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20070706001&part=112&SearchDay=

⁸ For details of the massive subsidies North Korea continued to receive from the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, See: Selig Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 311.

"juche" (self-reliance), is what kept the DPRK an active communist state, but also avoided its dominance by larger more powerful sponsors or neighbors like the Soviet Union or China.⁹

13. Despite the fact that Kim Il-sung was free to pursue a policy that suited his perceived needs of a militarily strong North Korea, a Stalinist-Juche government, and continued focus on eventually unifying of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea simply could not afford to focus on these issues without being completed financed by outsiders for the majority of its resources. These resources included (and still include) the majority of foodstuffs, oil for its industry and cities, and even the maintenance of the nationwide electrical grid. North Korea is a country that is seventy percent mountainous, and thus was (and is) simply incapable of agrarian self-sufficiency.¹⁰ In addition, it does not have enough coal or oil to sustain its economy and cannot (nor could it during the Cold War) afford to buy the necessary fossil fuels to sustain its economy. This led to one of the most profound (and threatening to U.S. policy) aspects of the Cold War - proxy operations.

14. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy operations, operations targeting each other but which occurred on the soil of other nation-states, were conducted by these other nation-states, and sometimes (fairly often) involved non-state actors (to include terrorist groups). Specifically there were some nations who supported either insurgent groups or terrorist groups. In the case of countries like Cuba and North Korea, they supported both insurgents and terrorists, financed by the Soviet Union. Thus comes the reason behind North Korea's support for terrorism and terrorist groups during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. This was a move (largely if not completely financed by the Soviet Union) that

⁹ For details on the unusual and formally implemented policy of "Juche," see: Grace Lee, "The Political Philosophy of Juche," *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring, 2003), URL: <http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf>

¹⁰ See: "Overview of Korea," *14th ILO Asian Regional Meeting*, 2006, URL: <http://www.mol2006busan.org/tour1.php>

allowed countries like North Korea and Cuba to maintain their sovereignty and independent policy goals while still "paying back" Moscow for massive subsidies that kept their governments afloat.¹¹

15. As a key part of fitting into the Soviet sphere of influence and "pulling their weight" among Moscow's allies, the North Koreans actively supported communist and Marxist movements. Key among these operations was the long-lasting war in Angola, where by 1984 there were 3,000 regular troops and 1,000 advisors. But simply providing support for insurgent groups was not enough. North Korea also operated training camps (in Angola) for guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). Both organizations were trained in terrorist tactics at these camps. But North Korea operated far more guerrilla and terrorist training camps within its own borders. It has been confirmed that between 1968 and 1988, North Korea built and operated at least 30 special training camps within its borders specializing in terrorist and guerilla warfare training. Reports at the time indicated that over 5,000 recruits from some 25 nations visited these camps to take part in various courses lasting anywhere from three to 18 months.¹²

16. Support for nation-states engaging in terrorist tactics was not the only activity that the North Koreans engaged in at their camps up until the late 1980s. In fact, Pyongyang supported a number of terrorist groups, particularly in the Middle East. According to National Security analyst Barry Rubin, "Up until the late 1980s, North Korea trained Palestinian terrorists,

¹¹ For more analysis on how the Soviet Union financed proxy states who in turn trained and/or supplied Marxist movements and/or terrorist groups, see: Nikos Passas "Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas," in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: a Comparative Perspective*, Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Eds.), (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007) 27-28.

¹² Daryl M. Plunk, "North Korea: Exporting Terrorism?" *Asian Studies Backgrounder* #74, Heritage Foundation, February 25, 1988, URL: <http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/asb74.cfm>

both those belonging to the PLO and from Syrian and Libyan-backed groups." Rubin further states, "In Lebanon during the 1970s and in Libya and Syria from the 1980s down to the present, North Korean soldiers have also trained terrorists for many groups including the Basque Spanish ETA, Palestinian Abu Nidal organization, Irish Republican Army, Italian Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Turkish radicals, and others. While many of these links have lapsed, in the 1990s, North Korea added Hezbollah and the anti-Turkish Kurdish PKK group to its roster of clients."¹³ Among the key players in Hezbollah who spent time in North Korea were Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general; security and intelligence chief Ibrahim Akil; and Mustapha Badreddine, head of counter-espionage operations.¹⁴ During a special press briefing given at the U.S. State Department, Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, on April 30, 1996, stated, "In the 1970s and '80s, North Korea had a very serious record of committing very serious acts of international terrorism."¹⁵

17. One specific case that is particularly interesting - and ties North Korea directly to a terrorist group in the Middle East - is the case of North Korea and the JRA. Almost from its inception the JRA had a client relationship with North Korean intelligence. Stéphane Courtois and Mark Kramer, in their book on the abuses of communist regimes, *The Black Book of*

¹³ Barry Rubin, "North Korea's Threats to the Middle East and the Middle East's Threats to Asia," in "Asia Book," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2005, URL: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/books/brkorea.html>

¹⁴ "Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerrilla Force," *Intelligence Online*, No. 529, 25 August – 7 September, 2006, URL: http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/060902/26241feaf4766b4d441a3a78917cd55c/Intelligence%20Online%20on%20Hezbollah.pdf

¹⁵ Philip C. Wilcox, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Department of State 96/04/30 Briefing: Amb. Wilcox on Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1995," Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *United States Department of State*, April 30, 1996, URL: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/cterror_briefing/960430cterror.html

Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, describe the context in which the JRA was founded, "Created at the end of the 1960's, when student radicalism in Japan was at its height and Maoism was in the air, the JRA quickly made contact with North Korean agents (the Korean community is quite large throughout the Japanese archipelago). The Korean agents passed instructions to their cadres and brought the arms the JRA was lacking, but they were unable to prevent a split in the group in the early 1970s, which resulted in a bloody conflict between the dissenting and orthodox factions."

18. "Accordingly, some of the cadres simply defected to North Korea, taking refuge in Pyongyang, where they remain as businessmen and intermediaries with the West." This came about when a group of nine armed JRA members (one of whom, Takeshi Okamoto, was the brother of Lod Airport terrorist Kozo Okamoto)¹⁶ hijacked a Japanese airliner in Tokyo and forced it to fly to North Korea in early April 1970. One of the hostages who was released in North Korea described the meeting between North Korean authorities and the JRA hijackers as "quite friendly."¹⁷ After the hijacking, a member of the JRA in Tokyo informed the New York Times that it was the JRA's objective to reach North Korea and that "[w]orld revolution is our ultimate goal, while our immediate objective is to set up revolutionary bases overseas.¹⁸" The other faction decided to internationalize its affairs even further, and joined up with Wadi Hadad. As a result of this alliance, three members of the JRA acted on behalf of the PFLP in killing 28

¹⁶ at p.16 "The guerillas who breed disgust", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Oct.14, 1977),

¹⁷ Takashi Oka, "Freed Japanese Tell of Hijack Ordeal," *N.Y. Times* (Apr. 6, 1970)

¹⁸ *Id.*

people at Tel Aviv's Lod airport in May 1972."¹⁹ The evidence chain connecting the North Korean government to the PFLP (and ultimately the JRA as well) is further cemented by evidence that the leader of the terrorist group, Dr. George Habash, made an official visit to North Korea during September of 1970, a trip where, it was reported, he was able to procure both weapons and funding.²⁰

19. The reasons for North Korean support of state and non-state actors during the Cold War were in actuality twofold. First, it confirmed and cemented North Korea's position as a solid ally within the Soviet sphere of influence (and was one of the factors that kept the enormous subsidies coming). Second, it was an active element in North Korea's policy at the time and today to actively support state and non-state actors who, like Pyongyang, were hostile to the United States and its allies. One cannot forget that North Korea has always regarded the United States as its primary enemy and its main threat to national survival. Israel is one of Washington's key allies and its most important ally in the Middle East. Thus, supporting terrorist groups that targeted Israeli citizens and Jews from other nations was an important element in keeping Washington's efforts focused on these terrorist acts, and not on North Korea.

20. North Korea made no attempts at hiding its anti-American and anti-Zionist agenda. For instance, a Joint Communiqué of North Korea and Syria, which appeared in one of the official organs of the North Korean government, *The Pyongyang Times*, stated that "[b]oth sides reached unanimity of views that every possible support should be given to this struggle of resistance [by the Palestinian people], so that they may play a vanguard, practical role in the

¹⁹ Stéphane Courtois and Mark Kramer, "Communism and Terrorism," in *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, Mark Kramer (Ed.), (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) 356-357.

²⁰ See: "World: Drama of the Desert: The Week of the Hostages," *Time*, September 21, 1970, URL: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942267-2,00.html>

struggle against the Zionist racialists and their master the U.S. imperialists.”²¹ That same edition of *The Pyongyang Times* published a speech given by Kim Il-sung to the Syrian delegation, in which he emphasized North Korea’s interest in Israel and the Palestinians:

Our people consider that the vigorous anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist struggle of the Syrian people, though they are far away from us geographically, is in itself a support and encouragement to the cause of national unification of ours. We will in the future, too, actively support and encourage with might and main the just struggle of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the Government of the Syrian people who are advancing toward the restoration of the occupied Arab land and building of a new life under the slogan of independence and self-sustenance, smashing the aggressive machinations of the U.S. Imperialists and the Zionists. We actively support the armed struggle of the Palestinian people for the restoration of their lost homeland and express firm solidarity with all the Arab peoples in their struggle for the territorial integrity and defense of the dignity of the Arab nation.²²

21. North Korea continues to follow this anti-Israel policy, as I will describe in the next section.²³

F. North Korea’s Current Policy of Support to Terrorism: It’s About the Money

22. North Korea’s current policy is no longer based on proxy support from the Soviet Union. This effectively ended in the late 1980s, perhaps as a result of the new Soviet government which at the time was taking a more conciliatory position toward democratized nations and the West. The last major act actually conducted by North Koreans occurred in Burma in 1983 and

²¹ *The Pyongyang Times*, October 6, 1969 (at p. 7)

²² (*id.*, at 6)

²³ See: Yoel Sanno, "Talks Aside, North Korea Won't Give up Nukes," *Asia Times*, March 2, 2004, URL: <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FC02Dg04.html>

was an attempt to assassinate the South Korean president.²⁴ Thus, one wonders why North Korea would continue to support terrorism. The answer is fairly simple - North Korea continues to be a rogue nation-state that will sell anything to anyone who will buy it. In the case of support to terrorism, this applies to training and weaponry sold to or through several terrorist groups in recent years.

23. Numerous reports point to strong evidence that North Korea supervised the building of underground facilities that Hezbollah constructed in southern Lebanon. In fact, according to several reports all of Hezbollah's underground facilities were built primarily under the supervision of North Korean instructors during the 2003-2004 time frame. These facilities included dispensaries for the wounded, food stocks, and arms dumps.²⁵ Thus, it is clear that the North Koreans provided assistance to Hezbollah, through Iran, for extensive operations that could be run from underground facilities.²⁶ It is likely that this (North Korean assistance in Hezbollah underground facilities) served as a major factor in the difficulties the Israeli military ran in to when prosecuting combat operations against Hezbollah during their conflict in 2006. In fact, as Israeli reporter Lenny Ben-David has articulated, "Hizbulah's military bases, armories, bunkers and communications networks were much more extensive than Israel's intelligence

²⁴ Brian McCartan, "Who's Bombing Burma?" *Asia Sentinel*, January 22, 2008, URL:

http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=998&Itemid=31

²⁵ "Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force," *Intelligence Online*, No. 529, 25 August – 7 September, 2006, URL:

http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/060902/26241fcf4766b4d441a3a78917cd55c/Intelligence%20Online%20on%20Hezbollah.pdf

²⁶ See: Con Coughlin, "North Korea to Help Iran Build Secret Missile Bunkers," *Daily Telegraph*, December 6, 2005, URL:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/06/12/wnkor12.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/06/12/ixnewstop.html>

"Report: North Korea Supervised Building of Hezbollah Underground Facilities," *East-Asia-Intel*, September 13, 2006, URL: http://www.east-asia-intl.com/cai/2006/09_13/12.asp

services estimated on the eve of the 2006 war.” Ben-David asserts that the tunnel building operations were conducted under the auspices of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation – a company that has been officially sanctioned by the United States for its activities.²⁷

24. Hezbollah also has reportedly received shipments of important arms that have been used to inflict casualties on Israeli troops – and civilians. According to sources in the South Korean press, Mossad has discovered that Hezbollah was able to hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv with short-range missiles containing components supplied by North Korea. According to the report, missile components were shipped from North Korea to Iran. The missiles were then assembled (presumably by Iranians) and transported to Hezbollah via Syria.²⁸ The connections that the North Koreans have with Hezbollah through both Iran and Syria are clear.²⁹ There are reports that Hezbollah has received other shipments of arms that have the potential to cause serious damage to Israel as well. According to the opposition group the “Reform Party in Syria” (RPS), Hezbollah acquired CW agents from North Korea during the summer of 2008. RPS (who reportedly has ties to the Lebanese intelligence community) states the recently acquired mustard and nerve gas was received with the help of Syria and can be mounted on Hezbollah’s short-range missiles that target Israel.³⁰ This would be a significant change in the threat to Israel’s security.

²⁷ Lenny Ben-David, “Mining for Trouble in Lebanon,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 29, 2007, URL: <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1192380684296&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter>

²⁸ Moon Chung-in, “[Outlook]The Syrian Nuke Connection,” *Joongang Ilbo*, November 26, 2007, URL: <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2883146>

²⁹ See: Larry Niksch, “North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?” *CRS Report for Congress*, July 10, 2008, URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30613.pdf>

³⁰ “Hizballah Acquires CW,” *Montreal Middle East Newsline*, July 14, 2008.

G. Conclusions

25. North Korea has shown throughout its history that it is a nation-state intent on engaging in rogue behavior. The reasons for this have been and will continue to be two fold. First, the North Korean leadership both fears and resents the government of the United States and its allies. Proliferation of training, weapons, and technology to non-state actors who engage in terrorist acts dangerous to the interests of America's allies in the Middle East, particularly Israel, is an effective way of continuing to ratchet up issues Washington must face and in keeping with the philosophy and vision of the DPRK government. But perhaps more importantly, economics has always played a role in Pyongyang's motivations for supporting terrorism, at first, because North Korea was being subsidized by the Soviet Union, and now, because of the badly needed hard currency that it provides for Pyongyang's elite. Understanding and containing North Korea's support to terrorism will continue to be a foreign policy dilemma for the United States as long as the DPRK exists.

26. Thus, North Korea as a matter of its official policy did provide material support, training, resources, weapons and safe haven to the JAR and PFLP during the period relevant to this civil action. By supporting and financing these terrorist groups North Korea advanced what it perceived as its foreign policy goals and carried out commitments it had to its own economic and political patrons such as the USSR and China. The Lod Airport massacre was facilitated, in part, as a result of the support, training and encouragement that North Korea provided to the two terrorists groups involved. It was a terrorist operation such as the Lod Airport massacre, carried out by communist revolutionary groups and targeting an important American ally such as Israel,

that North Korea strove for when it created its terrorist training program and aided groups such as the JRA and PFLP in perpetrating such attacks.

27. Based upon my personal knowledge and research of the type reasonably relied upon by an expert in my field, it is my opinion that North Korea supported the Japanese Red Army by providing its members with financial help, safe haven, and training. The claims as stated in the plaintiff's complaint are, in my expert opinion, valid and consistent with the facts.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on the 23rd of November, 2009



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bruce Bechhol". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a horizontal line underneath it.

Bruce Bechhol

EXHIBIT A



Bruce E. Bechtol

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Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (Ph.D. Union Institute) is a Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (2005 – present), and is a former Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College (2003-2005). Dr. Bechtol was an adjunct Visiting Professor at the Korea University Graduate School of International Studies (2006-2007) and was also an adjunct Professor of Diplomacy at Norwich University (2005-2009). He received his B.S. from Excelsior College (Liberal Studies), and his M.A. from Catholic University (International Affairs).

Dr. Bechtol was an Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1997 until 2003. He eventually served as the Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate (J2) on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Before beginning his career at the Defense Intelligence Agency, he was on active duty for 20 years in the U.S. Marine Corps, serving at various locations in the western Pacific and East Asia. He has written widely on Korean security issues, contributing articles to such journals as the *International Journal of Korean Studies*, *Pacific Focus*, the *Korea Observer*, *East Asian Review*, the *Air and Space Power Journal*, the *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, *Korean Quarterly*, and *Occasional Papers: The Journal of the Korea American Historical Society*. Formerly the Editor of the *Defense Intelligence Journal* (2004-2005), he currently sits on the Editorial Review Board of the *East Asian Review*. In addition to serving on the Board of Directors of the International Council on Korean Studies, Dr. Bechtol sits on the Board of Directors of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies.

Dr. Bechtol is the author of *Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea* (Potomac Books, 2007), and the editor of *The Quest for a Unified Korea: Strategies for the Cultural and Interagency Process*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 2007). In addition, he is a contributing author to several books to include, *The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century*, eds. Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2006), *Between Total Wars and Small Wars: Studies in the Societal History of the Cold War* (in German), ed. Bernd Greiner (Hamburg, Germany: Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2006), and *Divided Korea: Longing for Reunification*, ed. Ho Youn Kwon (Chicago, Ill: North Park University Press, 2004).

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